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ABSTRACT 
Macroeconomic conditions clearly exert an impact on the electoral 
fortunes of the governing party, but little agreement exists about the 
micro-level mechanisms which underlie the aggregate relationships, In 
particular, efforts to base the aggregate level findings on the financial 
fortunes of individual voters have proved fruitless. Hibbing and Alford 
suggest, however, that previous studies have failed to differentiate among 
three types of in-party candidates -- incumbents, open-seat candidates, 
and challengers of out-party incumbents -- and that only in the first 
category should we find individual voters holding the in-party responsible, 
The strongest support for the argument consists of an analysis of 1978 
survey data. This note replicates the Hibbing-Alford findings for 1978 
using a different methodology, and provides additional analyses from five 
more election studies. In all, four of six elections yield a pattern of 
coefficients broadly consistent with the Hibbing-Alford thesis, but in 
only two elections -- both on-year surprisingly enough -- are the results 
on solid statistical ground. 
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I. INTRODUCT ION 
In a recent article Professors Hibbing and Alford propose an 
ingenious resolution of an empirical puzzle addressed (created?) by 
several earlier A.JPS articles. The puzzle involves identifying the 
individual level mechanism(s) which underlie the aggregate level 
relationships between economic conditions and the Congressional vote. 
Various studies (e.g. Fiorina. 1978) have failed to ground the 
aggregate relationship in the personal impact of financial conditions 
on the individual voter. Thus, three alternative bases of the 
aggregate relationship have been proposed. First, Fiorina (1978, p. 
440) and Jacobson and Kernell (1981) suggest that the electoral effect 
of economic conditions is at least partly indirect: in "bad" times 
good out-party candidates enter the lists, and contributions to the 
out-party look like good investments, while the situation of the in­
party is just the opposite. Second, Kinder and Kiewiet (1979) argue 
that voting reflects collective or sociotropic judgments about the 
state of the economy, which may bear little relationship to personal 
economic circumstances . Third, Kramer (1981) raises the possibility 
of methodological artifact by developing a response model in which 
judgments about one's personal financial condition bear no 
relationship to the vote even while a genuine behavioral relationship 
exists. 
Hibbing and Alford suggest that the personal impact basis of 
the aggregate relationship has been dismissed too quickly. The 
implicit model of previous authors is a party responsibility model 
which presumes that happiness (unhappiness) with economic conditions 
predisposes voters towards a favorable (unfavorable) view of the 
incumbent (Presidential) party. In Kernell's (1977, p. 49) words: 
Given the public's low levels of interest in and knowledge about 
politics, what better criterion exists for voting one's 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction with current government programs 
and performance than by voting for or against the President's 
party? 
In place of this simple party responsibility model Hibb.ing and Alford 
offer instead a party and incumbent responsibility model in which only 
Congressional incumbents of the President's party are held accountable 
for economic conditions. According to Hibbing and Alford a discerning 
electorate would be unlikely to visit the sins of the President and 
his Congressional minions on the heads of open seat candidates; 
moreover, the electoral fortunes of out-party incumbents may or may 
not be the mirror image of those of in-party incumbents. In support 
of their thesis Hibbing and Alford present an aggregate analysis based 
on postwar Congressional elections, and an individual level analysis 
based on the 1978 CPS study. The purpose of the present note is to 
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examine the Hibbing-Alford thesis more closely by evaluating it with 
the data from five more election studies, 
II, THE EV IDENCE 
Hibbing and Alford present both aggregate level and individual 
level analyses. Because the aggregate analysis is inconclusive, I 
will focus on the individual level analysis.1 The latter utilizes 
three variables (party ID, personal financial situation, and district 
incumbency status) in an examination of Congressional voting by 
respondents in the 1978 NES/CPS sample. The analyses which follow 
rely on the same basic model but incorporate several methodological 
adjustments, First, the dichotomous dependent variable (vote) calls 
for the application of an estimation procedure other than regression; 
probit is used here, Second, dummy variable representations of the 
ordinal party ID and personal financial situation measures are more 
flexible than the strong assumption that these survey measures are 
equal interval scales. And third, rather than estimate separate 
equations within each category of district incumbency statue, an 
interactive specification permits estimation of one equation using all 
observations -- with resulting gains in efficiency. 
specification is as follows: 
The exact 
Pr(Preeidential Party Vote) = a  + b1 (out x FS same) + b2(out x 
FS better) + b3 (0pen x FS worse) + b 4(open x FS same) 
+ b5(open x FS better) + b6( In x FS worse) 
+ b7 ( In x FS same) + b8 (In x FS better) 
+ b9 ( In-Party Identifier) + b 10 ( Independent),
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(1) 
(To prevent statistical degeneracy one of the three party ID 
categories and one of the nine incumbency status/financial condition 
interactions are omitted), 
The first column of Table 1 contains a replication of the 
Hibbing and Alford 1978 analysis, modified as described above. As 
seen, the results resemble those previously reported. Party ID has a 
major effect on the vote, and not at all surprisingly, so does 
incumbency -- the sets of coefficients for out-party, open, and in­
party districts clearly differ in the anticipated manner, Of most 
interest, however, are the interactions between incumbency status and 
financial situation, As argued by Hibbing and Alford, no intelligible 
patterns appear for out-party districts and open seats, while the 
hypothesized relationship for in-party districts appears, though the 
coefficient pattern is not monotonic, 
[Table 1 here] 
While the magnitudes of the in-party interactions more or less 
resemble the hypothesized pattern, their importance remains to be 
determined (the simple significance tests reported in the table 
signify only that the coefficients are different from zero -- an 
incumbency sta.tus effect -- not necessarily from each other -- the 
Hibbing Alford effect.) The appropriate significance test can be 
performed by estimating a second model in which the effects of 
personal financial condition are assumed not to vary across the three 
classes of districts, ie. the following simple additive model: 
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Pr (Presidential Party Vote) c + d 1 (FS same) + d2 (FS better) + 
d3(In-party incumbent) + d4(open seat) + d5 (In-party identifier)
+ d 6(Independent) 
Model 2 is a special case of model 1 in which appropriate coefficients 
are constrained to be equal. Thus, minus two times the difference in 
the logs of the likelihood functions of the restricted and 
unrestricted models is distributed as a Chi square with degrees of 
freedom equal to the difference in the number of estimated 
coefficients -- four (McKelvey and Zavoina, 1975). Such a procedure 
gives some indication of whether the more complicated model provides a 
significant improvement over the simpler alternative. For the 1978 
data the test shows an improv ement in goodness of fit for the Hibbing­
Alford model that is significant at the .OS level (see Table 2), 
Methodological variations notwithstanding, the Hibbing-Alford 1978 
findings are clearly supported. 
[Table 2 here] 
Those who have worked with survey data in this area have 
learned to be wary, however . For one thing, results apparent in one 
year often vanish in others. Thus, Table 1 also presents tests of the 
Hibbing- Alford interactive model in five other elections for which I 
have district incumbency status merged with SRC/CPS data, The results 
are rather interesting, The Hibbing-Alford findings appear to extend 
to the two off-year elections, 1958 and 1974, though the pattern is 
not monotonic in 1958, and the differences are not statistically 
significant (see Table 2) in 1974. For the Presidential elections, 
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(2) however, the results are mostly negative. There is no trace of the 
hypothesized pattern in 1960 (the marginally significant entry in 
Table 2 arises from unanticipated differences among the open seat 
coefficients), In 1976 the pattern is confused, with the only 
monotonic effect for out party incumbents. As table 2 shows, however, 
these diferences are not significant at conventional levels. Finally, 
in 1980 we find monotonic patterns for both in-party and out-party 
incumbent districts, but again, table 2 shows that these estimates do 
not approach statistical significance, 
To sum up, four of six elections, including all three mid­
terms, yield a pattern of coefficients broadly consistent with the 
Hibbing-Alford thesis, but in only two elections -- both mid-terms 
can we conclude with any confidence that the effects of personal 
financial condition really differ across district incumbency status, 
At best the additional estimations suggest that the electoral fortunes 
of in-party incumbents vary with personal financial condition only 
when the President himself is not available as a target. 
How plausible is such a hypothesis? Frankly, it seems to fly 
in the face of common sense, One would expect candidates of the 
incumbent party to be more closely tied to national conditions in a 
Presidential year especially when the incumbent President himself 
leads the ticket, as in 1976 and 1980. But in no presidential year do 
we find significant effects, Perhaps we should expect strong effects 
in mid-terms held during recessionary periods, as in 1958 and 1978, 
But why not then in 1974? Theoretical expectations aside, some 
existing research also tends to cast doubt on the plausibility of the 
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Hibbing-Alford thesis modified to apply only to mid-terms. Tufte 
( 1978, p. 112, 119) finds considerably stronger effects of variations 
in real disposable income for on-year elections than for off-years, 
though the measure of Presidential evaluation is not the same for the 
two analyses. Once again, we se em to have a disparity between the 
findings from individual cross-sectional analyses and aggregate time-
series analyses. 
III. SUMMARY 
The Hibbing-Alford thesis is a nice idea, though it presumes a 
level of voter discermnent I would have doubted prior to seeing the 
data. Still, the evidence for the thesis is fragile, The aggregate 
analysis is inconclusive. and the individual level analyses hint at a 
somewhat implausible limitation of the party and incumbent 
responsibility model to mid-term elections. Certainly, too, the 
evidence for the latter suggestion is also fragile given that models 1 
and 2 are quite underspecified, One possible explanation for the 
stronger results evident in mid-terms may be that a greater variety of 
influences are at work in the on-year elections and thus muddy the 
underlying relationship between financial condition and the vote. 
Various measures of presidential preference could be added to model 1 
in an effort to consider such a possibility.2 In all likelihood, 
however, addition of such other variables will wipe out any trace of a 
direct link between personal financial condition and the vote 
(Fiorina, 1981, Chapter 8), In sum, we still have far to go before we 
can confidently ground the known aggregate relationships in the 
personal impact of economic conditions on individual voters, 
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HIBBING-ALFORD THESIS IN SIX 
197 8 
Constant -1.64* 
In-party ID 1.65* 
Independent .89* 
In-Party Districts 
FS worse 1.51* 
FS same 1.50* 
FS better 1.94* 
Open Seats 
FS worse 1.06* 
FS same .43 
FS better .59* 
Out-Party Districts 
FS same - .18 
FS better - .30 
n 858 
i2 .60 
*p < .05 
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TABLE 1 
ELECTIONS, CONTESTED CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS ONLY 
1958 1960 1974 1976 1980 
-1.65* -1.16* - 1.24* -1.44* -1.69* 
2 .49* 2.20* 1.75* 1.61* 1.30* 
1.15* .88* .95* .80* .72* 
.47 .44* .52* 1.10* 1.37* 
.32 .44* .73* 1.39* 1.50* 
1.12* .43* .87* 1.30* 1.57* 
- .23 - .89 .43* .47* .74* 
.46 .71* .34 .38* .65* 
.02 .23 .11 .51* .52 
.06 - .17 - .16 .16 .21 
.06 .02 - . 13 .29* .38* 
595 889 923 1302 752 
.64 .56 .47 .49 .47 
Year 
1958 
1960 
1974 
1976 
1978 
1980 
TABLE 2 
TESTS FOR SUPERIORITY OF HIBBING-ALFORD INTERACTIVE MODEL 
OVER SIMPLE ADDITIVE MODEL 
-2 LLRI -2 LLR
A x2/df=4
418. 87 408. 86 10.01 
505.34 496 .22 9.12 
388.64 383 .34 5 .30 
552.07 549.86 2.21 
478.43 468.05 10.38 
294.59 293 ,03 1.56 
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p 
< .os 
< .10 
< .30 
< .so 
< .os 
< .90 
* 
1. 
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FOOTNOTES 
I wish to thank (name of referee #2) for helpful comments in an earlier 
version of this note. 
The aggregate level analysis presented by Hibbing and Alford consists of 
three OLS regressions (in-party incumbents, open seats, out-party 
incumbents) of the non-Southern House vote on real per capita income 
(rpci), for the 17 elections between 1946 and 1978. The estimated 
coefficients of rpci are as follows (t statistics in parentheses): 
In-party: 
Open-seats: 
Out-party: 
1.40 (4.30) 
.86 (2,02) 
-. 95 (1. 92) 
While it does appear that the effect is most pronounced for in-party 
incumbents, the conclusion of insignificant effects for open seat 
candidates and out-party incumbents hinges upon application of a two-tail 
test, Under the plausible hypothesis that the electoral fortunes of open 
seat in-party candidates will vary positively with economic conditions, 
and those of out-party candidates negatively, both coefficients are 
significant at the .05 level. (For a one-tail test Pr (t > 1.75 < 
.05/df=lS)), The preferred procedure would seem to be a test for 
differences in slope though Hibbing and Alford (footnote 6, p. 431) feel 
such a test would not be appropriate, Simply eye-balling the evidence it 
appears unlikely that the slopes for in-party incumbents and open seat 
in-party candidates are significantly different, or that the magnitudes 
of the slopes for in-party and out-party incumbents are significantly 
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different , And, of course, in any given election, only 25-50 non-South 
open seats exist. For this reason alone one would expect the open seat 
regression to yield less conclusive results than the others. 
2, In a similar vein further work with the aggregate data would do well to 
employ more fully specified models. Most obviously. if Hibbing and 
Alford would add Presidential performance ratings to their analysis 
(limited to mid-terms, of course), they could contrast their aggregate 
results to Tufte's (1975; 1978, Ch. 5) findings , 
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